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Abstract. Wireless sensors and actuators are increasingly used to automate resi-
dential properties. Such home automation (HA) systems are generally built around
simple devices and network protocols in order to keep system complexity and
prices low. Nearly all used protocols do not provide any security mechanisms
and it is possible to inject messages accidentally or on purpose. As it is not feasi-
ble to upgrade already deployed devices or to simply re-design the used protocols
it is desirable to find a protection mechanism that can be used to augment exist-
ing systems. We propose to use jamming in order to prevent unsolicited messages
from reaching devices in home automation systems. We demonstrate a jamming
device that can be used to augment HA systems to add an additional layer of
protection. The device can be integrated into existing home automation systems.
1 Introduction
Sensors and actuators are increasingly used to automate residential properties. Wireless
devices are generally used as existing homes have to be retrofitted and rewiring should
be avoided. The resulting home automation (HA) system may be used to improve the
energy efficiency of the heating system, monitor electrical appliances or control lighting
within the property.
A vast number of HA devices are available on the market, using a variety of com-
munication protocols with no particular standard being widely adopted. To reduce cost
and system complexity, vendors typically use proprietary protocols, designed with sim-
plicity in mind. A common Modulation scheme used amongst such cheap devices is
On-Off-Keying (OOK), combined with a medium access control (MAC) layer designed
only to support single hop networks with a limited address range.
Lack of any implemented security mechanisms is a commonality amongst these
protocols; confidential data is openly transmitted, and more importantly, message au-
thentication is unsupported. Messages can be injected into a network (accidentally or
intentionally), which may then be inadvertently processed by actuator nodes. In many
cases this may just be an inconvenience, the heating may turn on when not needed, for
example. Other times this may lead to serious situations, such as lights being switched
off when walking down steep stairs, or the front door unlocking during the night.
Existing HA systems could be improved by using devices which implement proper
security mechanisms. However, given the vast number of protocol specifications, the
number of stakeholders involved and the number of already deployed devices, it can be
assumed that HA systems will continue to make use of insecure devices and protocols
for the foreseeable future.
To add security to existing HA systems we propose the use of jamming. It has been
shown that protection against message injection into a wireless network can be provided
by jamming [1]. The communication medium is monitored and if an unsolicited mes-
sage is detected, an interference signal is generated to prevent the target device from
processing this message. Obviously such jamming must be executed carefully, only
messages targeted to particular nodes should experience interference; other communi-
cation, for example in neighbouring properties, should not be affected.
Fig. 1. Jamming device consisting of a Zolteria Z1 node running Contiki with attached daugh-
terboard featuring a 433MHz AUREAL RX4MM5 receiver and RF-Solutions AM-RT5-433
transmitter used for directed jamming.
We have constructed a jamming device (see Figure 1) capable of blocking transmis-
sions using a variety of popular home automation protocols in the 433MHz band. The
device consists of a Zolteria Z1 [?] node running Contiki with an attached daughter-
board featuring a 433MHz AUREL RX-4MM5 receiver and RF-Solutions AM-RT5-
433 transmitter. The device can be attached to a HA controller which uses it to im-
prove system security while retaining existing protocols and devices. Our demonstra-
tion shows this device in action.
2 HA Protocols
Most HA devices use simple On-Off-Keying (OOK) where a carrier wave (typically
433MHz, although other frequencies are used as well) is alternately switched on and
off. The various implementations of this modulation scheme vary in the timing and se-
mantics of this on-off transition, used to represent data bits. To reduce cost, devices
typically only provide receive or transmit capability but not both, thus in the absense
of any feedback or acknowledgement channel, the sender will normally transmit each






data bit = 0
 
Second 
data bit = 1
 
Third 
data bit = 0
 
32th 
data bit = 0
 
Postamble
32 Data bits, 26 bit sender address, 6 bit payload
Fig. 2. Unmodulated signal of a packet transmission using the HomeEasy protocol. Each data bit
is represented by 2 pulses with specific timing constraints. The described unmodulated signal is
multiplied with a carrier signal of 433MHz for transmission.
not implemented, and instead a receiver will only process a message if a number of
consecutive, identical messages are received. Receivers are paired with specific trans-
mitters, and react upon receiving a message containing a matching transmitter address
(included in every message). Multi-hop communication is not used as the transmission
range of 433MHz signals is sufficient to cover average sized properties.
Figure 2 shows the popular HomeEasy protocol as example. Transmissions begin
with a preamble consisting of a 275µs carrier wave transmission (on) followed by a
2675µs silent period (off). A transmission ends with an off period of 10ms (postamble).
A 0 is encoded as a 275µs on period followed by a 275µs off period followed by a
275µs on period and 1225µs off period. A 1 is encoded as sequence 275µs on, 1225µs
off, 275µs on and 275µs off. A data packet is 32 bits long and contains a 26 bit source
address and 6 bit payload (e.g. on or off for switches).
3 Jamming Strategy and Jamming Device
At the centre of a typical HA system lies the controller, which may be equipped with
a number of wireless transceivers to communicate directly with devices. All commu-
nication runs through the central controller entity. Thus, the controller is aware of all
activity in the system; it knows when genuine messages have to be transmitted to actu-
ator devices. Hence, we use the controller to configure and control jamming devices, a
number of which may be placed about the property to provide good coverage.
The simplest form of a working jammer would be a device which continuously
transmits a high power carrier wave signal, which the controller may interrupt to transit
one of its own messages. Unfortunately, it is not advisable to operate such a jammer as
it is illegal in most countries to block a frequency range in such a way, and it would also
prevent operation of any HA system in neighbouring properties.
Our jamming device is capable of understanding the protocol semantics of a number
of HA protocols, such as the HomeEasy Protocol shown in Figure 2. The device scans
the observed frequency band continuously until the transmission signature of specified
HA protocols is detected; for the HomeEasy protocol the transceiver searches for the
preamble sequence. When an ongoing transmission is detected the transmitted address
is monitored. The device may only scan the start of the address transmission (address
range) to determine if jamming is required. Scanning for address ranges rather than a
complete address has the advantage that more time remains to apply the interference
signal, which in our current implementation is a continuous carrier wave, applied for
the remaining duration of packet transmission after address detection.
Our prototype device is based on a Zolteria Z1 [?] which contains a MSP430 pro-
cessor and a 802.15.4. wireless transceiver. The on chip AES encryption can be used
to communicate securely between a home automation controller and a number of de-
ployed jamming devices in a property. A daughter board utilising a 433MHz AUREL
RX-4MM5 receiver and RF-Solutions AM-RT5-433 transmitter is connected to a single
shared antenna via an analogue switch.
4 Demonstrator
The demonstration consists of a HA controller and a number of devices, such as wire-
lessly controlled socket plugs. The setup operates in the 433Mhz band. Our jamming
device is attached to the home automation controller and monitors the address range of
the devices used. A wireless remote control is provided to represent a potential attacker
(using an address of the devices in the setup). Jamming can be activated/deactivated and
the system can be tested to see if messages are successfully intercepted.
5 Summary
The prototype device is able to prevent processing of unsolicited messages at actuators
within HA networks. However, this protection is not 100% effective. There is a small
probability that jamming may not be successful. The jamming device may fail to detect
an incoming message or the applied jamming signal may fail to prevent reception of the
message at the target device. Jamming failure rates are low (around 0.5% using Home-
Easy in usual setting) but our future work aims on lowering failure rates to increase
protection.
The demonstrated system does not address all security issues present in HA systems.
For example, spoofing of messages originating from sensors or message confidentiality
in general are not addressed. However, the device may represent a valuable security
building block for future work.
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